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Studies of aid effectiveness abound in the literature, often with opposing conclusions. 
Since most time-series studies use data from the exact same publicly available data 
bases, our claim here is that such differences in results must be due to the use of 
different econometric models and methods. To investigate this we perform a 
comprehensive study of the long-run effect of foreign aid (ODA) on a set of key 
macroeconomic variables in 36 sub-Saharan African countries from mid-1960s to 2007. 
We use a well-specified (Cointegrated) VAR (CVAR) model as our statistical 
benchmark. It represents a much-needed general-to-specific approach which can 
provide broad confidence intervals within which empirically relevant claims should fall. 
Based on stringent statistical testing, our results provide broad support for a positive …/ 
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long-run impact of ODA flows on the macroeconomy. For example, we find a positive 
effect of ODA on investment in 33 of the 36 included countries, but hardly any evidence 
supporting the view that aid has been harmful. From a methodological point of view our 
study documents the importance of transparency in results reporting in particular when 
the statistical null does not correspond to a natural economic null hypothesis. Our study 
identifies three reasons for econometrically unsatisfactory results in the literature: 
failure to adequately account for unit roots and breaks; imposing seemingly innocuous 








The question whether foreign aid is e⁄ective or not has since the seminal contribution on ￿ aid,
savings and growth￿by Papanek (1972) divided academics and aid practitioners into several
camps (see Tarp 2006). Some are disappointed and highly sceptical, a prominent example being
Easterly (2003). He focuses on aid￿ s inability to buy growth. Others, in the middle ground, hold
that aid has worked, albeit not perfectly so. They argue, inter alia, that modest expectations
are called for (Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010)). A third approach is to view aid as a moral
obligation of rich countries that will send ￿ forth mighty currents of hope￿and lead to ￿ the end
of poverty￿(Sachs 2004).
The polarized nature of the aid debate and the use of cross-country econometric studies
as justi￿cation for opposing views may seem puzzling. After all, most studies use data from
the exact same publicly available data bases, including aid and macro data from the Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the Penn World Tables (PWT) and the
World Development Indicators (WDI). This implies that di⁄erences in results are bound to be
embedded in the use of (i) di⁄erent econometric models and methods, (ii) di⁄erent exogene-
ity/endogeneity assumptions, and (iii) di⁄erent choices of data transformations. For example,
the literature reports di⁄erent assumptions about exogeneity and endogeneity of aid as well as
di⁄erent measurements of variables (logs, levels, ratios, growth rates etc.). Unfortunately, such
choices regularly change the empirical results, sometimes crucially so, and can, therefore, be
problematic.1
We wish to contribute to the learning about the crucial impact of methodological choices,
and in this paper o⁄er an econometrically coherent picture and benchmark of aid and its e⁄ect
on a set of key macroeconomic variables in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). African examples are
often used to suggest that aid is ine⁄ective, on the grounds that African people remain among
the poorest in the world despite having been major recipients of foreign aid for several decades.
Based on ordinary least squares regression analyses, Dollar and Easterly (1999) argue that
aid has a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on investment in only eight of 34 country cases. The
question we address here is whether such views are ￿rmly rooted in sound empirical testing and
evidence. In contrast with most of the literature we rely on country-based time-series analysis,
rather than on cross-country regressions. Our approach is similar to Morrissey (2001) and
Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2005) in focussing on the long-run impact of aid on GDP and
its main macroeconomic determinants (including gross investment, and private and government
consumption). We o⁄er a unique perspective in coverage by studying a total of 36 SSA countries
for which we were able to get reasonably complete data for the last ￿fty years (i.e. from the
mid-1960s to 2007). Riddell (2007) argues forcefully that country-based evidence provides the
only reliable backdrop against which to judge whether aid works or not. Temple (2010) adds
nuance, but we depart from the shared observation that many of the econometric methods
1See Hansen and Tarp (2001) for a critique of Burnside and Dollar (2000), Arndt et al. (2010) for a re-
examination of Rajan and Subramanian (2008), and Mekasha and Tarp (2011) for a rebutttal of Doucouliagos
and Paldam (2008), on exactly these grounds.
1used in the cross-country (as well as time-series) literature are based on strong assumptions,
which need to be satis￿ed for the conclusions to be valid. It is a matter of concern that these
assumptions are not always clearly stated and carefully checked (see for example Dollar and
Easterly 1999). We recall in passing, the Temple (2010) observation that ￿ aid is ine⁄ective￿
is now dangerously close to being elevated to a stylized fact in some theoretical papers. This
further motivates the empirical analysis pursued here. After all, whether aid works or not
cannot be settled based on theory alone. Finally, we deplore the widespread misuse in the
literature of insigni￿cant parameters to conclude that aid is ine⁄ective. Temple (2010: 4448),
notes: ￿ An insigni￿cant coe¢ cient should usually be seen as absence of evidence, not evidence
of absence, at least until the economic implications of a con￿dence interval has been explored￿ .
We aim to make a signi￿cant contribution to such exploration.
To become a satisfactory benchmark, a statistical model must encompass as many aspects as
possible of the di⁄erent econometric choices in the literature. The (Cointegrated) VAR (CVAR)
model ful￿lls this requirement. Starting with an explicit stochastic formulation of all variables
without constraining them in pre-speci￿ed directions, the CVAR provides broad con￿dence
intervals within which empirically relevant claims should fall (Hoover, Juselius, and Johansen
2008, Juselius 2009). As a matter of fact, the VAR model is in its unrestricted form simply a
convenient reformulation of the covariances of the data and as such can be used as a solid basis
for much needed general-to-speci￿c testing (Hendry 2009). Moreover, because it uses rigorous
statistical principles as the criterion for a good empirical model there is little arbitrariness in
the CVAR approach (Spanos 2009). This makes it optimally designed to embed and shed light
on the econometric consequences of typical empirical approaches and choices, including:
￿ The use of single equations to estimate the e⁄ect of aid (see e.g. the discussion in Hansen
and Tarp 2000). This approach is likely to su⁄er from endogeneity bias, in particular when
weak instrumental variables are used. Instead of assuming aid exogeneity/endogeneity,
we model all variables, including aid, jointly as a system of equations and test whether aid
is endogenous or exogenous. A system approach has the additional advantage of allowing
us to estimate more complicated short-run and long-run dynamic e⁄ects of aid.
￿ The use of panel data to estimate the e⁄ect of aid on growth (see also Arndt et al. 2010).
Panel data models are only adequate in a statistical sense under a number of fairly strict
assumptions about the underlying causal mechanisms. As these may not be empirically
satis￿ed we choose instead to estimate (36) individual country models which allows us
to study their similarities and dissimilarities. The latter can be used to classify the
SSA countries into more homogeneous sub-groups which are su¢ ciently similar to justify
subsequent panel data analysis.
￿ The use of cross-sectional analyses to estimate the e⁄ect of aid at a speci￿c point of time.
While such analyses can provide valuable knowledge, they cannot say anything about the
dynamic transmission of aid and its important short- and long-run e⁄ects on the macro
economy. In contrast, our time-series approach makes it possible to study how the macro
2system adjusts in the short-run to deviations in long-run equilibrium relationships and to
study the long-run impact of exogenous shocks.
The structure of the CVAR model allows us to formulate and test a number of hypotheses
on causal links between aid and the macrovariables based on which the SSA countries can be
classi￿ed into four groups according to the following diagram. The notation x ! z (x 9 z)
means that variable x has (does not have) a long-run impact on the variable z:
Aid 9 Macrovariables Aid ! Macrovariables
Macrovariables 9 Aid I III
Macrovariables ! Aid II IV
Case I implies that aid and the macrovariables are unrelated and Case II that aid has no
e⁄ect on the macrovariables, but the latter are in￿ uencing aid. Case III implies that aid has
a long-run e⁄ect on the macrovariables, but the reverse does not hold ￿i.e. aid is exogenous
with respect to the macrovariables. Case IV implies interdependence between aid and the
macrovariables: aid has a long-run impact on the macrovariables, but the reverse is also true.
Our empirical analysis is organized around these four cases, noting that Case I and II are broadly
consistent with a thesis about aid ine⁄ectiveness, while III and IV suggest aid is e⁄ective in
the sense of having an e⁄ect on key macrovariables.
To be sure, economic time-series data are generally found to be both unit root non-stationary
and subject to structural breaks, and SSA countries are no exception in this respect. Unit root
non-stationarity could not be rejected for any of the 36 country data sets. Extraordinary events,
such as wars, violent overthrows of government, varying aid conditionality and modalities etc.
have also been frequent in many of the SSA countries studied here. Unless such events are
adequately controlled for, statistical inference is likely to be jeopardized. We address this
problem by testing whether the most crucial events have shifted the equilibrium relationship
between aid and the macro variables in a permanent way.
In contrast to many studies of aid impact in the literature (see for example Dollar and
Easterly 1999) we carefully test the validity of the implicit homogeneity assumption behind
any use of transformed data, such as GDP per capita or aid as a share of GDP. When data
are non-stationary, such testing is particularly important as invalid homogeneity restrictions
are likely to change cointegration properties and statistical inference in often unknown ways
(Kongsted 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our variables and pro-
vides a brief overview of the hypothetical transmission mechanisms of aid on the macroecon-
omy. Section 3 discusses data transformations and measurements and Section 4 the CVAR
methodology. The econometric test procedures for aid e⁄ectiveness/ine⁄ectiveness and aid en-
dogeneity/exogeneity are presented as parameter restrictions on the autoregressive form and
interpreted in terms of the long-run impact matrix of the moving average form. Section 5
3discusses the empirical model speci￿cation for each of the 36 country models, and Section 6
reports the causal test results and classi￿es the individual countries according to the causal
links diagram. Section 7 takes a closer look at the sign and signi￿cance of the e⁄ects of aid
on the individual macrovariables, while section 8 summarizes and discusses results. Section
8 concludes that there is little support to highly critical views of aid and recommends that
further research be focused on a small group of countries where the evidence is vexed.
2 Data and macroeconomic transmission channels
In line with most aid-e⁄ectiveness studies, we rely on DAC ODA net-disbursements as our
measure of foreign aid.2 An alternative is the so-called E⁄ective Development Assistance (EDA)
indicator (see Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven 1998), but this data series is not so long and
covers fewer countries. The e⁄ect of foreign aid on GDP growth is assumed to be transmitted
through its impact on investment, and private and government consumption. The data used
here for these variables are from The Penn World Tables (PWT) database Heston et al. (2009)
which covers all SSA countries in this study, except for Sudan for which we use data from the
World Development Indicators (WDI) data base.3
The ￿rst transmitting macrovariable included is real gross investment, comprising both pri-
vate and public outlays. In the Two-Gap model the main idea is that investment is constrained
by one of two restrictions (gaps): insu¢ cient domestic savings (the original Harrod-Domar
setup) or low foreign exchange holdings (due to low exports earnings) needed to import capital
goods (Chenery and Bruno 1962 and Chenery and Strout 1966). By ￿lling these ￿nancing gaps
aid can increase the level of investment and thereby lead to growth (see e.g. Hansen and Tarp
2000). A third constraint, i.e. the ￿scal gap, was added by Bacha (1990): aid given directly to
governments may supplement insu¢ cient domestic tax revenues, ￿nancing public investment
projects or other needed expense.
The Harrod-Domar and two-gap models have over the years been subject to scathing cri-
tique,4 and their widespread and simplistic use in practice have no doubt fuelled over-optimistic
expectations about aid￿ s potency in furthering growth. Yet, whether one believes that these
models can serve a useful purpose or not, few would dispute the notion that aid (among its
other uses) is meant to contribute to growth via investment and capital accumulation; and
even in the absence of gaps (shortages of funds) aid may still change the equilibrium level of
investment. For example, aid ￿ ows may help raise private investment through improvements
in infrastructure, which are likely to make private investment more pro￿table.
In addition to investment some aid is clearly intended for consumption (see e.g. Morrissey
2001), and it is widely agreed that aid does increase public consumption.5 If such aid is used
wisely for growth-enhancing activities in, for example, the health and education sectors other
2Available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx.
3Note that, WDI covers less than half of the countries studied here. The WDI data base is available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
4See e.g. Dollar and Easterly (1999: 548-49), and Easterly (1999).
5See for example Burnside and Dollar (2000).
4transmission channels are working. On the other hand, aid may also lead to non-productive
government consumption or, via tax reductions, to higher private consumption (see Gri¢ n
(1970) and Heller (1975) and e.g. White (1992) for a survey).6 The literature on aid fungibility
has emphasized that aid may have undesirable consequences even when earmarking is possible
(Gri¢ n (1970) and e.g. Devarajan and Swarup (1998)). In any case, the broad question whether
aid impacts on consumption variables or not is of interest.
It seems reasonable to assume that donors￿aid allocation decisions depend on the relevant
macrovariables relative to the level of economic activity mostly measured by the level of real
GDP. Also, the literature abounds with studies using aid relative to GDP rather than aid as
such. Our study thus includes real GDP as one of the relevant macrovariables which allows us
to test the validity of imposing such ratios from the outset.
In sum, the aim of our paper is to study the transmission mechanisms for foreign aid on
the macroeconomy and to establish whether foreign aid has had a positive long-run impact on
investment and/or real GDP, but also on private and public consumption.
3 Data transformations and measurements
Macroeconomic variables are typically trending over time. The variables analyzed here are no
exception suggesting a multiplicative rather than additive model speci￿cation. By taking logs
the models are brought back into additive form.7 However, the logarithmic transformation is
innocuous as long as the variables are strictly positive or not too close to zero. This turned
out to be problematic in a few cases. First, the level of foreign aid for most SSA countries
was often very low in the ￿rst years of the sample period, jeopardizing the validity of the log
transformation. We addressed this problem by omitting some of the ￿rst annual observations
based on a test procedure in Nielsen (2008). Second, ODA (being a net measure of aid) became
negative for both Gabon and Mauritius in 2003 and we had to choose between using the full
sample and non-log of aid or the log of aid and a sample ending in 2002. Since the former
speci￿cation seemed less satisfactory on almost all accounts, we preferred the latter option.
Thus, the subsequent empirical analyses are exclusively based on the log-aid speci￿cation.
Most empirical models in the literature use ratios, such as aid-to-GDP, GDP per capita,
aid per capita etc., see for example, Murthy, Ukpolo, and Mbaku (1994), Dollar and Easterly
(1999), Gomanee et al. (2005), M￿ Amanja and Morrissey (2006), and Malik (2008). While
frequently used, such data transformations may signi￿cantly in￿ uence the results unless the
implied parameter restriction is empirically valid. For example, in a regression analysis of
GDP per capita, Yt=Nt; on the aid-to-GDP ratio, Aidt=Yt; the relation, ln(Yt=Nt) = ￿0 +
￿1 ln(Aid=Yt)+ error term; is based on the implicit assumption of long-run homogeneity between
6For a review of the literature on fungibility and Fiscal-Response see e.g. McGillivray and Morrissey (2004).
7As many studies in the literature are performed using non-log aid, we carried out a sensitivity check,
estimating all country models not only for the log-aid but also for the non-log aid speci￿cation. Not surprisingly
it turned out that the former was generally superior in terms of model ￿t and uncorrelated errors as evidenced
by the comparison of model misspeci￿cation diagnostics for the two model versions in Table 9 in the appendix
Computations based on the non-log model can be obtained from the authors.
5GDP, population and foreign aid, i.e. the regression corresponds to the general relation, lnYt =
￿0+￿1 lnAid+￿2 lnNt+ error term, ￿1;￿2 > 0; but with the homogeneity restriction, ￿1+￿2 =
1; imposed a priori.8 We tested the hypothesis that lnYt and lnNt enter homogeneously for a
number of countries and it was always strongly rejected. Even more importantly, the order of
integration of lnNt was found to be close to I(2) in contrast to the other variables (in particular,
lnYt) that were I(1). Scaling an I(1) variable with an I(2) variable, as in ln(Yt=Nt); is likely
to aggravate the econometric problems of unreliable inference as demonstrated in Kongsted
(2005).
Another frequently investigated hypothesis is that aid-to-GDP a⁄ects investment-to-GDP
(see inter alia Boone (1996) and Hansen and Tarp (2000)). Such a speci￿cation involves,
however, an implicit homogeneity assumption between GDP, investment and aid.9 Several
in￿ uential studies have used this type of transformed data without ￿rst checking their empirical
validity (see e.g. Dollar and Easterly 1999 and the studies surveyed in Roodman 2007) despite
the ease with which it can be done.
4 The econometric approach
As already alluded to in the introduction, the literature contains examples of econometric
studies which are based on essentially the same data but which reach opposite conclusions.
This is often the consequence of starting from a constrained model where prior assumptions
have been allowed to in￿ uence the speci￿cation of the model. In such a case it is di¢ cult
to know which results are due to the assumptions made and which are true empirical facts.
Given our wish to remain as objective as possible we have followed a di⁄erent route: data
are not constrained from the outset by prespeci￿ed theoretical restrictions unless the empirical
adequacy of such restrictions has been tested and accepted (Hoover et al. 2008).
The fact that economic data are often well described by a VAR model suggests that empiri-
cally relevant economic models need to be formulated as dynamic adjustment models in growth
rates and equilibrium errors, the so-called vector Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) models,
which is another name for the CVAR models (see for example, Hendry (1995) and Juselius
(2006)). Such models are designed to distinguish between (i) in￿ uences that move equilibria,
also referred to as pushing forces, which give rise to stochastic trends, and (ii) in￿ uences that
correct deviations from equilibrium, i.e. pulling forces, which give rise to long-run relations
(Hoover et al. 2008). The division into pulling and pushing is based on the cointegration
rank, r; imposed as a reduced rank restriction in the VAR model. The test procedures are in
what follows ￿rst introduced based on the autoregressive form of the CVAR model and then
translated into hypotheses on the long-run impact of aid on the macrovariables based on the
moving average form.
8The ￿ coe¢ cients can then be computed as ￿0 =
￿0
1￿￿1 and ￿0 =
￿1
1￿￿1:
9The latter is in turn supposed to in￿ uence GDP per capita.
64.1 The cointegrated VAR model
We consider a 5-dimensional VAR model for x0
t = [aidt;yt;invt;ct;gt]; where aidt stands for
ODA, yt for real GDP, invt for real investment, ct for real private consumption, and gt for real
government consumption, and small letters denote logarithmic values. The model is structured
around r cointegration relations (the endogenous or pulling forces) corresponding to p ￿ r
stochastic trends (the exogenous or pushing forces).
The pulling force is formulated as the cointegrated VAR model,
￿xt = ￿￿
0xt￿1 + ￿1￿xt￿1 + ￿Dt + "t; (1)
where xt is a p-dimensional vector of economic variables, Dt is a m￿1 vector of m deterministic
terms (such as a constant and dummy variables), "t ￿ Niid(0;￿) is a p ￿ 1 vector of errors,
￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator, ￿;￿ are p ￿ r coe¢ cient matrices, ￿1 is a p ￿ p matrix of
short-run adjustment coe¢ cients, ￿ is a p ￿ m matrix of coe¢ cients, and the lag length k in
the corresponding VAR in levels is here assumed to be at most 2. If k = 1; then ￿1 = 0 and the
system, after having been pushed away from equilibrium by an exogenous shock, will adjust
back to equilibrium exclusively through ￿. In the more general case when k = 2; the system is
also adjusting to lagged short-run changes in ￿xt￿1 and ￿1 will also in￿ uence the adjustment
dynamics.



























































ixt is an equilibrium error and ￿ij is an adjustment coe¢ cient.
It is useful to partition the data vector x0
t = [x1t;x0
2t] where x1t = aidt and x0
2t = (yt;invt;ct;gt)
to discriminate between long-run e⁄ects associated with foreign aid and macrovariables, and







where [￿11;￿12] corresponds to the ￿rst row and [￿11;￿0
21]
0 to the ￿rst column in ￿1.
In the present setup, a cointegration relation such as ￿
0
1xt = aidt￿yt￿￿0 would describe an
economy where the share of aid to GDP has been stationary over time. Any deviation from its
underlying constant level would initiate an adjustment reaction in variable j described by ￿j1
to bring this ratio back to its mean. The ￿j1 coe¢ cients would tell us whether it is GDP or aid,
say, that take the adjustment after the system has been pushed out of equilibrium. However,
to provide empirical content to the hypotheses underlying our causal links diagram (presented
7in the Introduction), it is su¢ cient to focus on ￿ve simple hypotheses formulated as parameter
restrictions on the coe¢ cients in ￿; ￿, and ￿1 :
￿ H1: Aid is long-run exogenous.10 This is tested as (￿11 = ￿12 = ￿13 = 0); implying a
zero row in ￿ for aid: In this case, foreign aid has not been a⁄ected by any deviations
from long-run equilibria in the macroeconomy, but might have been a⁄ected by short-run
movements in the macrovariables. In this case, aid has generally had a long-run e⁄ect on
the macrovariables (unless H5 is also true).
￿ H2: Aid is exogenous. This is tested as (￿11 = ￿12 = ￿13 = 0 and ￿12 = 0): In this case,
aid has a⁄ected the macrovariables (unless H5 is also true), but has not been a⁄ected by
them, neither in the long- nor in the short-run. When the lag length is one, ￿1 = 0 and
H1 and H2 become identical.
￿ H3: Aid is purely adjusting, i.e. aid is completely endogenous in the system. This is
tested as (￿11 6= 0;￿21 = ￿31 = ￿41 = ￿51 = 0); implying that the ￿rst column in ￿ is
proportional to a unit vector. In this case aid has been exclusively determined by the
macrovariables, and shocks (changes) to aid have had no permanent e⁄ect on the system.
￿ H4: Aid is long-run excludable from the cointegration relations. This is tested as
(￿11 = ￿12 = ￿13 = 0); implying that the ￿rst row of ￿ is zero. In this case, aid has
been unrelated with the long-run movements of the macro variables.
￿ H5: Aid is short-run and long-run excludable, i.e. (￿11 = ￿12 = ￿13 = 0 and ￿21 = 0): In
this case aid has no e⁄ect on the macro variables, neither in the short nor in the long-run.
We now move on to show how these hypotheses can be translated relying on Młller (2010)
into restrictions on the long-run impact matrix C that correspond to the causal links in refer-
ence.
4.2 The common trends representation




i=1("i + ￿Di) + C
￿(L)("t + ￿Dt) + P0; (3)
where C = ￿?(￿0
?(I ￿ ￿1)￿?)￿1￿
0
? is a matrix of rank p ￿ r; ￿? and ￿? are the p ￿ p ￿ r
orthogonal complements of ￿ and ￿; respectively, C￿(L) is a stationary lag polynomial, P0
depends on the initial values, and ut = ￿0
?"t describes p ￿ r autonomous common shocks
that have a permanent e⁄ect on the variables in the system (see Johansen 1996). For example,
￿0
?;1 = [1;0;0;0;0] and ￿0
?;2 = [0;￿1;0;0;1] would describe a situation where shocks to aid
and the government consumption/GDP ratio are the exogenous forces.
10This is also called weakly exogenous in the econometrics literature.
8Table 1: Testable hypotheses consistent with causal links between aid and the macrovariables
Aid 9 Macrovariables Aid ! Macrovariables
Macrovariables Case I: (C21 = 0;C12 = 0): Case III: (C21 6= 0;C12 = 0):
9 Aid H2 and H5 are jointly accepted. H3;H5 rejected and H2 (H1 if k = 1) accepted.
Aid and the macrovariables are unrelated Aid is exogenous.
Macrovariables Case II: (c11 = 0;C21 = 0;C12 6= 0): Case IV: (C21 6= 0;C12 6= 0):
! Aid H3 is accepted. Aid has no-long run impact H1 ￿ H5 are rejected. Aid has a long-run
on the macrovariables. e⁄ect on the macrovariables and vice versa.
For the purpose of analyzing the long-run impact of aid on the macroeconomy all questions
of interest can be interpreted in terms of the long-run impact matrix, C: The element in the
ith row and the jth column describes the long-run impact on the ith variable of a shock to the
jth variable.
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Based on the above partitioning of the data vector x0
t = [x1t;x0








21 ￿ (c21;c31;c41;c51); C12 ￿ (c12;c13;c14;c15):
If C21 = 0, then aid has no long-run e⁄ect on any of the macrovariables, and if C12 = 0,
the reverse holds and implies that aid is exogenous. If (C21 = 0 and C12 = 0); then aid and
the macrovariables are unrelated. The submatrix, C22, describes the long-run e⁄ects between
the macrovariables alone. The latter e⁄ects are outside the focus of this paper and will not be
discussed.
Under the assumption of no current residual correlations between aid and the macrovari-
ables11, Młller (2010) shows that the hypothesis (C21 = 0 and C12 = 0) can be tested as the
joint test of H2 and H5 implying that aid is unrelated with the macrovariables. The hy-
pothesis that shocks to aid has no long-run impact on the system (c11 = 0;C21 = 0) can be
tested as H3 implying that aid has been adjusting to the macrovariables but not pushing
them. The hypothesis that aid is exogenous, C12 = 0; can be tested as H2 and implies that
(￿11 = 0;￿12 = 0;￿13 = 0 and ￿12 = 0):
Table 1 summarizes the relevant hypotheses and tests within our causal links diagram.
11This was broadly supported in all empirical models.
95 Empirical model speci￿cation
Our empirical approach starts from a statistically well-speci￿ed VAR model for each of the 36
countries under study and then reduces this general statistical model by simpli￿cation testing.12
It responds to the economic questions of interest by embedding the economic model and major
institutional events within the statistical model and uses strict statistical principles as criteria
for an adequate empirical model.
When it comes to testing speci￿c hypotheses we often face the fundamental challenge that
the statistical null does not necessarily coincide with the economic null. For example, while
there is broad agreement based on macroeconomic principles (see Rajan and Subramanian 2008)
that aid can be expected to increase growth and should be tested as such, aid ine⁄ectiveness
has often been ￿ established￿based on (i) testing a statistical null which has been given priority
over relevance as an economic hypothesis, and (ii) relying on insigni￿cant parameters to draw
implications. Instead of reporting ￿ starred￿results as an indication of signi￿cance at the 5%
or 1% level, we shall therefore use empirical rejection probabilities (p-values) as a measure
of support for a null which is chosen by statistical convenience rather than by its economic
reasonableness.
To put this in perspective, a standard 5% test implies that we are prepared to reject the
null hypothesis that aid is ine⁄ective only if there is strong evidence that it is incorrect, i.e.
when the probability that it can be true is less than 5%. But, the probability of rejecting a
correct alternative hypothesis that aid has a positive e⁄ect on the macrovariable (making a
type 2 error) can be very high even for relatively large and positive parameter values. For
example, the probability of rejecting aid e⁄ectiveness when the true parameter value (￿) is
1.96￿￿ is 50%. For smaller parameter values it is even higher. In small samples like ours, with
a maximum of 50 annual observations, ^ ￿￿ is often large and the probability of a type 2 error is
likely to be high even for large and positive aid e⁄ects. The occurrence of extraordinary events
such as armed con￿ icts, droughts, lack of institutions will often increase ^ ￿￿; hence aggravating
the problem.
For these reasons and because aid e⁄ectiveness would seem to be a reasonable economic
prior, one should in principle require higher p-values than the conventional 5% or 1% to conclude
that the empirical evidence is in favour of aid ine⁄ectiveness. But, we also recognize that an
estimated aid coe¢ cient with a p-value greater than 0.2, say, indicates a small, or imprecisely
measured, e⁄ect.
5.1 Speci￿cation of individual country models
Due to a large number of missing observations (particularly on aid), 13 SSA countries were
omitted from this study. Table 8 in the appendix provides a list of these countries with a brief
explanation of the reason for non-inclusion.
12All estimation results have been obtained by the software packages CATS in RATS (Dennis, Hansen, and
Juselius 2006) and OxMetrics (Doornik and Hendry 2001).
10Many SSA countries became independent only around 1960 and the ￿rst years of transition
from colonial to new independent states and administrations were often volatile and gradual.
Moreover, the International Development Association and some of the bilateral donor agencies
were only established in the 1960s (Tarp 2006). In a period where the relationship between
aid and the macrovariables has not yet reached its long-run equilibrium, the linear relation-
ship postulated by the VAR model is likely to provide a poor approximation. In such cases,
model estimates will often improve when non-representative years are left out. To check this
possibility, we applied a test for detecting in￿ uential observations described in Nielsen (2008)
to the individual country models. For many of these countries the ￿rst ￿ve years, 1960-65, were
singled out as excessively in￿ uential and omitted from the analysis. Table 2 reports the choice
of sample period for each country.
Omitting the ￿rst ￿ve observations reduces an already small sample to a size that renders
available recursive test procedures for assessing parameter stability powerless. As the VAR
model is derived under the assumption of constant parameters, which may not be a plausible
assumption for all model parameters over a period of 40-50 years, this is a potential problem.
Because parameter instability is frequently associated with periods of political and economic
turmoil, such as war, social unrest, severe droughts, interventions, and adjustment reforms,
we improve parameter stability by controlling for such extraordinary events, using di⁄erent
types of dummy variables. For example, a step dummy DsZZt de￿ned as (0,....,0,0,1,1,1,1...,1)
starting in year ZZ; can measure a shift in the equilibrium mean, for example due to war. If it
is restricted to the cointegration relations and the model has two lags, an unrestricted impulse
dummy, ￿DsZZt = DpZZt; will automatically enter the model. A permanent impulse dummy,
DpZZt; de￿ned as (0,....,0,0,1,0,0,0...,0) or a transitory impulse dummy, DtrZZt; de￿ned as
(0,....,0,0,1,-1,0,0...,0) enter the VAR model unrestrictedly. Table 2 reports the type of dummy
variables used in each country model.
While controlling for the e⁄ect of extraordinary events in the long- and short-run structures
of our model is likely to improve parameter stability, it does not necessarily solve the problem
of poor data quality which may be serious in some cases. We recognize this point up-front but
note that these are the available data that have been analyzed extensively in the cross-country
literature. We also emphasize that our results represent average historical e⁄ects of aid over
the last 40-50 years in each of the 36 countries rather than deep structural parameters, but
we highlight that in contrast with the cross-country literature our estimates of aid impact are
indeed allowed to vary from one country to another.
After having accounted for extraordinary events over the sample period, a VAR lag length
of k = 1 was su¢ cient to describe the variation in the data for the vast majority of 29 countries.
For the remaining 7 countries k = 2 was su¢ cient. Table 2 reports the choice of k for each
country.
115.2 Determination of the cointegration rank
The cointegration rank determines the division into pulling (i.e. the equilibrating) forces and
pushing (i.e. the exogenous) forces. The choice of r is, therefore, often crucial for the results.
The maximum likelihood test procedure, the so-called trace test (Johansen 1996) is based on a
sequence of tests of the null of p￿r unit roots for r = 0;1;2;:::;p￿1: As discussed in Juselius
(2006), Chapter 8.5, some of these null hypotheses may not correspond to plausible economic
null hypotheses. In particular, this is often the case for large values of p ￿ r (many stochastic
trends) and small values of r (few equilibrium relations), as economic theory would a priori
predict that aid and the macrovariables are related in the long run. To avoid not rejecting
an implausible economic null, just because it happens to correspond to a conveniently testable
statistical null, we need to specify in advance an economic prior for the number of autonomous
stochastic shocks, p￿r￿; where r￿ is the number of cointegration relations which are consistent
with this prior, and expected to push the system. It would then be justi￿ed to test the economic
null of p￿r￿ stochastic trends using a 5% test combined with a sensitivity check of the closest
adjacent alternatives (see Juselius 2006).
In the present study all variables are in real terms. We should therefore expect at least one
stochastic trend to originate from cumulated productivity shocks. But foreign aid is in itself
sometimes assumed to be exogenous in the system and, hence, could constitute a second driving
trend. Thus, the economic prior would in most cases correspond to either fr = 3;p ￿ r = 2g
or fr = 4;p ￿ r = 1g: Our results show that the former case is empirically supported for the
majority of countries, whereas the latter was found for one country only. A sensitivity analysis
suggested that fr = 2;p￿r = 3g may be the best choice in 12 cases, whereas fr = 1;p￿r = 4g
obtained essentially no empirical support (see Table 2).13
The dilemma of testing a statistical null that does not correspond to the economic null is
particularly relevant for the rank test. Because of the importance of the choice of rank, Table
2 reports for each country the statistically most credible value of rank, r￿; as well as the second
best alternative, either r￿ ￿ 1 or r￿ + 1: The choice of r￿ is based on a variety of statistical
criteria, such as the trace test, the largest unrestricted root of the characteristic polynomial for
a given r, the t-ratio of the ￿ir coe¢ cients and the graphs of the rth cointegration relation. See
Juselius (2006) for a more detailed discussion. The reason why we do not exclusively rely on
the trace test (as often done in empirical applications) is that it becomes literally uninformative
for samples as small as 40-45. In this case the power is often unacceptably low resulting in a
failure to reject unit roots even when the alternative is both economically and empirically more
plausible. But because the choice of cointegration rank is often everything except unambiguous
and the reported results can be sensitive to this choice, we have chosen to report the p-values
not just for the preferred choice of rank, r￿; but also for r￿ + 1 or r￿ ￿ 1: This should ensure
that the reader gets as much information as possible about the consequences of this important
choice.
13The documentation for this (including programme code for CATS for each country) can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
12Table 2: Sample period, lag length, dummy variables and ￿rst and second best choice of
cointegration rank
Country Sample lag Dummy Variables Coint. rank
k 1st 2nd
Benin 1965-2007 1 Dp75t;Dp94t;Ds82t 3 4
Botswana 1960-2007 1 Dtr65t;Dtr88t 2 3
Burkina Faso 1965-2007 2 Dtr71t 2 3
Burundi 1962-2007 1 Dp70t;Dp72t;Dp75t;Ds93t 3 4
Cameroon 1965-2007 1 None 3 2
Ctrl. Afr. Rep. 1965-2007 1 Dtr82t;Ds96t 3 2
Chad 1965-2007 1 Ds80t;Ds04t 3 2
Comoros 1970-2007 1 Ds92t;Ds94t;Ds98t;Dtr00t 3 2
Rep. of Congo 1965-2007 1 Ds05t 2 3
Djibouti 1970-2007 2 Dp75t;Ds99t 4 3
Ethiopia 1965-2007 1 Ds87t;Ds92t 3 2
Gabon 1965-2002 1 Dtr7478t;Dtr8900t 3 4
The Gambia 1960-2007 1 Ds71t;Ds82t 3 4
Ghana 1966-2007 2 Ds05t 3 4
Guinea 1963-2007 1 Ds90t;Ds03t;Dp02t 3 4
Kenya 1965-2007 1 Ds68t;Ds94t 3 2
Lesotho 1963-2007 1 Dp83t;Dp99t;Dtr65t;Ds70t;Ds78t 3 2
Liberia 1970-2007 1 Ds90t;Ds97t;Ds03t 2 1
Madagascar 1965-2007 2 Ds86t;Ds97t 2 3
Malawi 1965-2007 1 None 2 1
Mali 1965-2007 1 Ds72t;Dp76t 3 2
Mauritania 1965-2007 1 Ds92t 2 1
Mauritius 1965-2002 1 Ds76t 3 2
Niger 1965-2007 1 Ds73t;Ds84t 2 3
Nigeria 1960-2000 1 Ds67t;Ds03t;Dp01t 3 2
Rwanda 1960-2007 1 Dp81t;Ds94t 3 2
Senegal 1965-2006 1 Ds69t 3 2
Seychelles 1960-2007 1 Dtr65￿
t;Ds03t 2 3
Somalia 1970-2007 1 Dtr92t;DTrend96t 2 3
Sudan (WDI) 1960-2007 2 Ds96t 3 2
Swaziland 1976-2007 1 None 3 2
Tanzania 1962-2007 2 Dp83t;Dtr90t;Ds80t 2 3
Togo 1965-2007 1 Dp93t 2 3
Uganda 1964-2007 1 Dp79t;Dp94t;DTrend88t 3 4
Zambia 1967-2007 1 Dp04t;Ds93t 3 2
Zimbabwe 1963-2007 2 None 2 3
Notes: Dtr65
￿
t has the form (...,0,1,0,-1,0,0,...), and Dtr7478t￿ 1ft=1974g￿1ft=1978g
and Dtr8900t is de￿ned analogously.
Sources: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx; World Development Indicators (WDI) database;
Heston et al. (2009)
13As already mentioned, neither the choice of full rank (data in levels are stationary) nor
zero rank (data are non-stationary but not cointegrated) was supported by the statistical tests.
Therefore, assuming a stationary VAR in levels without testing (for example because the theory
model predicts stationarity), or estimating a stationary VAR in di⁄erences (for example to get
rid of unit roots in the data) is likely to jeopardize the statistical inference. In the former case,
standard inference would be incorrect, and in the latter case, valuable long-run information in
the data (possibly the only reliable information) would be discarded.
The fact that r = 1 was not supported by the statistical evidence is at odds with the fre-
quent use of single equation models in the literature. This is because a single equation model
is consistent with just one long-run (cointegration) relation between the included variables (as
well as exogeneity of aid). The massive support for r > 1 means there are several cointe-
gration relations in development aid data that need to be understood if one is serious about
understanding what existing data actually have to tell. We discuss this further in Section 8.
6 Testing causal links between aid and the macrovari-
ables in the SSA countries
The hypotheses about aid exogeneity, endogeneity, and excludability that are associated with
the causal links in Table 1 are all testable nested hypotheses in the following sense: Case I, i.e.
aid is unrelated to the macrovariables fC21 = 0;C12 = 0g; is the most restrictive hypothesis:
If not rejected with a reasonable p-value, it implies a rejection of at least some aspects of the
remaining cases II-IV. If Case I is rejected, but Case II fc11 = 0;C21 = 0;C12 6= 0g cannot be
rejected with a reasonable p-value, it implies a rejection of cases III-IV. If Case II is rejected
but Case III cannot be rejected with a reasonable p-value, it implies a rejection of Case IV. If,
￿nally, Case III is rejected, then we end up in Case IV which describes the general case: aid is
neither exogenous nor completely endogenous. Shocks to aid are pushing to some extent but
macrovariables have also a⁄ected aid. This suggests a sequence of testing that starts from the
most restrictive hypothesis and ends with the least restrictive one, i.e. from Case I to Case
III. Based on the test outcome each SSA country can be classi￿ed according to the causal links
diagram in Table 1.
6.1 Testing aid ine⁄ectiveness
The purpose of this section is to test whether aid has been completely unrelated to the
macrovariables or, alternatively, had no long-run impact on them.
6.1.1 Aid and the macrovariables are completely unrelated
The condition fC21 = 0 and C12 = 0g can be tested as the joint hypothesis of long- and
short-run exclusion, H5; and strong exogeneity, H2: For the majority of the SSA countries for
which the lag length is one (altogether 29), the test of the above condition corresponds to the
14joint test of long-run exogeneity, H1; and long-run exclusion, H4. Table 3 reports the rejection
probabilities (p-values) of the joint test.
When interpreting the estimated p-values it should be kept in mind that the power of the
joint test to reject an incorrect null is typically related to the number of (signi￿cant) parameters
being tested. For instance, the hypothesis H4 implies r zero restrictions on the ￿ parameters
of the CVAR, and the hypothesis H5 implies p ￿ 1 zero restrictions on the ￿1 matrix (when
k = 2). Thus, the case (p = 5;k = 2;r = 2) corresponds to six restrictions, and the case
(p = 5;k = 1;r = 2) corresponds to 2. If the p ￿ 1 = 4 coe¢ cients in ￿21 are not highly
signi￿cant (which a priori is likely to be the case) then a signi￿cant parameter in ￿ can be hard
to detect (as many insigni￿cant parameters tend to lower the power of the joint test). For the
majority of the countries (29) a lag length of one was su¢ cient to describe the variation in the
data. Thus, low power due to many insigni￿cant coe¢ cients may only be a problem in the
remaining few cases.
To provide as much information as possible about the sensitivity of the results to the choice
of cointegration rank we have calculated the p-values of aid ine⁄ectiveness for all possible ranks.
To avoid information over￿ ow, we distinguish between empirically plausible and less plausible
results by emphasizing the preferred choice of rank, r￿; in bold face and the second best choice,
either r￿ + 1 or r￿ ￿ 1; in italics. In addition, we have left out the p-values for r < r￿ or
the second best choice. The reason is that the result for the best or the second best choice
is overriding the previously obtained result in the following sense: If, for example, aid is only
signi￿cant in the third cointegration relation, then we should expect high p-values for r = 1;2
but a low p-value for r = 3: If r￿ = 3; then the result for this case is overriding the previous
ones. If on the other hand, aid adjusts signi￿cantly to the ￿rst and/or the second cointegration
relation, then the p-value for r￿ = 3 would still re￿ ect the previous results.
Table 3 shows that the restriction fC21 = 0 and C12 = 0g receives little or no support
in the vast majority of the SSA countries. Only in two cases, Comoros, and Tanzania, is it
possible to obtain fairly strong support for the joint hypothesis. Another two cases, Benin and
Botswana, show somewhat more moderate support for the preferred case, but this conclusion is
reversed when increasing the rank with one (the second best choice). This leaves Comoros and
Tanzania as the only countries for which aid and the macrovariables seem essentially unrelated.
Of course, this conclusion is based on a fairly restricted information set and it may not be
robust to the inclusion of other important omitted variables. A more detailed econometric
analysis of the outlying countries would be needed to clarify why these two countries seem to
di⁄er from the majority.
6.1.2 Aid is purely adjusting to the macrovariables?
Section 4 discussed a procedure for testing the hypothesis that the level of aid has been purely
adjusting to the macrovariables implying that shocks to aid have not had any signi￿cant long-
run impact on the macrovariables. This could, for example, describe a situation where donors
routinely allocate aid according to a simple rule involving the macrovariables and corrupt
15Table 3: Estimated p-values for the null of no aid e⁄ect on the macrovariables
Aid is unrelated with macrovariables (H2&H5) Aid is purely adjusting (H3)
Country Cointegration rank Cointegration rank
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
Benin * * 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Botswana * 0.19 0.03 * 0.00 0.00 0.09 *
Burkina Faso * 0.05 0.01 * 0.03 0.84 0.65 *
Burundi * * 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 *
Cameroon * 0.95 0.01 * 0.00 0.10 0.16 *
Ctrl. Afr. Rep. * 0.08 0.03 * 0.00 0.00 0.03 *
Chad * 0.30 0.02 * 0.00 0.93 0.83 *
Comoros * 0.72 0.12 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
Republic of Congo * 0.00 0.00 * 0.02 0.26 0.15 *
Djibouti * * 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.23
Ethiopia * 0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.01 0.01 *
Gabon1) * * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.29
The Gambia * * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.36
Ghana * * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.86
Guinea * * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Kenya * 0.00 0.00 * 0.01 0.08 0.04 *
Lesotho * 0.06 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
Liberia 0.61 0.05 0.09 * 0.00 0.00 * *
Madagascar * 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.06 0.28 *
Malawi 0.00 0.00 * * 0.00 0.25 * *
Mali * 0.04 0.01 * 0.00 0.01 0.00 *
Mauritania 0.00 0.00 * * 0.00 0.01 * *
Mauritius1) * 0.01 0.00 * 0.02 0.01 0.04 *
Niger * 0.27 0.05 * 0.00 0.02 0.47 *
Nigeria * 0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.01 0.03 *
Rwanda * 0.02 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 *
Senegal * 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.13 *
Seychelles * 0.00 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 0.45 *
Somalia * 0.01 0.00 * 0.00 0.13 0.57 *
Sudan * 0.21 0.04 * 0.00 0.00 0.05 *
Swaziland * 0.12 0.00 * 0.02 0.33 0.39 *
Tanzania * 0.70 0.37 * 0.00 0.00 0.06 *
Togo 0.13 0.03 0.02 * 0.00 0.00 0.06 *
Uganda * * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zambia * 0.00 0.00 * 0.01 0.09 0.04 *
Zimbabwe * 0.00 0.00 * 0.04 0.05 0.05 *
Note: The sample period for Gabon and Mauritius end in 2002 due to a negative aid entry in 2003.
Source: Authors￿estimations.
16government o¢ cials use the money for private purposes. But it needs to be emphasized that
the test results are not invariant to omitted variables, and a failure to reject the hypotheses is
evidence of aid ine⁄ectiveness within our speci￿c model. Other relevant variables, if included,
may change the test results. With this caveat in mind we shall interpret the test results in
Table 3.
For the preferred rank, r￿; the null could be safely rejected based on zero or small p-values
for 28 countries. In addition, Cameroon, Senegal and Somalia could easily be added to this
group as their p-values are fairly moderate (0.13-0.16). These results remain reasonably robust
to the ￿rst or second best choice of cointegration rank. In 24 cases (including Cameroon
and Senegal) the failure to reject the null is unaltered. Only for Burkina Faso, Chad, and
Swaziland is there reasonably strong evidence for non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no
long-run e⁄ect of aid on the macrovariables and this conclusion is robust to the ￿rst and second
best choice of cointegration rank. For the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, and Malawi the evidence
is more inconclusive in the sense that the p-values for the ￿rst and second best speci￿cation
are moderately sized.
Thus, the hypothesis that aid has been purely adjusting to the selected macrovariables
did not obtain much support. The only SSA countries for which there is convincing evidence
in favour of accepting this type of aid ine⁄ectiveness seems to be Burkina Faso, Chad and
Swaziland.
6.2 Testing aid exogeneity
Many empirical studies in the early aid literature are based on regression analysis with aid as
the key explanatory variable (Hansen and Tarp 2000). Such a model choice is implicitly based
on the assumption that aid is exogenous to the macrovariables. Because the macroeconomic
stance of a developing country is likely to in￿ uence the amount of foreign aid allocated by donor
countries, aid endogeneity has been recognized in the literature as a potential problem (see e.g.
Mosley 1980) and typically addressed by introducing instrumental variables. Even though
good instrumental variables can potentially control for the simultaneity bias, su¢ ciently strong
instruments are di¢ cult to ￿nd. This problem can be avoided by estimating a full system of
equations as we do in this paper. In addition, a system approach allows us to test aid exogeneity
using likelihood based test procedures, thereby checking whether assumptions of aid exogeneity
have created an inference problem in the early studies.
Strong exogeneity (H2) corresponds to C12 = 0 and implies that aid has been una⁄ected by
the macrovariables both in the long- and short-run whereas long-run exogeneity (H1) does not
as such imply C12 = 0: This is because aid in this case is only una⁄ected by the macrovariables
in the long run but can be a⁄ected by short-run movements in the macro variables. The results
in Table 4 are for tests of C12 = 0; noting that H1 is identical to H2 for the 29 SSA countries
with a lag length of one.
The exogeneity test is reported for all countries, independently of whether they were already
classi￿ed as Case II or Case I economies. For Case I economies (i.e. Comoros and Tanzania)
17Table 4: Estimated p-values for the hypothesis of aid exogeneity
Country k Case Cointegration rank
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4
Benin 1 IV * * 0.06 0.00
Botswana 1 IV * 0.18 0.09 0.12
Burkina Faso 2 II * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Burundi 1 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Cameroon 1 IV * 0.96 0.00 0.00
Ctrl. Afr. Rep. 1 III * 0.15 0.16 0.22
Chad 1 II * 0.10 0.00 0.00
Comoros 1 I * 0.42 0.07 0.10
Rep. of Congo 1 II * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Djibouti 2 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Ethiopia 1 IV * 0.02 0.01 0.00
Gabon 1 IV * * 0.00 0.00
The Gambia 1 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Ghana 2 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Guinea 1 IV * * 0.02 0.03
Kenya 1 IV * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lesotho 1 III * 0.14 0.22 0.04
Liberia 1 III 0.92 0.71 0.62 0.32
Madagascar 2 II * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malawi 1 III 0.28 0.05 0.04 0.03
Mali 1 III * 0.22 0.16 0.01
Mauritania 1 IV 0.08 0.19 0.13 0.14
Mauritius 1 IV * 0.05 0.07 0.05
Niger 1 III * 0.92 0.18 0.01
Nigeria 1 IV * 0.10 0.00 0.00
Rwanda 1 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Senegal 1 IV * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Seychelles 1 IV * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Somalia 1 II * 0.16 0.04 0.00
Sudan 2 III * 0.23 0.20 0.11
Swaziland 1 II * 0.04 0.00 0.00
Tanzania 2 I * 0.37 0.27 0.15
Togo 1 III * 0.38 0.40 0.13
Uganda 1 IV * * 0.00 0.00
Zambia 1 IV * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 2 IV * 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
1. The entry ￿ 0.00￿stands for p-values less than 0.005.
2. The preferred choice of cointegration rank is in bold fact, the second best choice in italics
3. For the countries with k = 2; the calculations are done in OxMetrics
Source: Authors￿estimations.
18the hypothesis of unrelatededness also implies C12 = 0 and a high p-value does not mean that
the previous conclusion of aid unrelatededness has been changed to aid exogeneity. For the six
Case II countries we would, however, expect exogeneity to be rejected, and it does. For the
preferred choice of rank, strong exogeneity of aid receives little support in the majority (25) of
the SSA countries and for the second best choice, the conclusions are basically unchanged. Of
the 11 countries for which exogeneity was not outright rejected, only six (Lesotho, Liberia, Mali,
Niger, Sudan, and Togo) could be safely classi￿ed as Case III economies, whereas Botswana,
Central African Republic, and Mauritania might be accepted based on more moderately sized
p-values. Of these, only Central African Republic was classi￿ed as a case III economy mostly
motivated by the test results in Table 6. Somalia and Malawi are borderline cases which we
classi￿ed as a Case II economies. Altogether, the conclusion that aid is exogenous only for a
small minority of the SSA countries seems reasonably well grounded demonstrating the peril
of assuming aid exogeneity without testing.
To sum up, the classi￿cation of the SSA countries into our four categories describing dif-
ferent transmission mechanisms between foreign aid and the macrovariables was in most cases
reasonably clear, but there were also a few borderline cases where a country could almost
equally well have been referred to a di⁄erent category. The overall conclusion that most of the
SSA countries belong to the group of Case IV economies prompts for a more detailed analysis
of the long-run impact of aid on individual macrovariables. This is the purpose of the next
section.
7 The long-run e⁄ect of aid on individual macrovariables
While the tests in Section 6 allowed us to classify each SSA-country according to the overall
e⁄ect of aid, they are uninformative about the sign and magnitude of the individual e⁄ects
of aid on the individual macrovariables. Obviously, a negative e⁄ect of aid on say GDP or
investment, while signi￿cant, would not be evidence of aid e⁄ectiveness and we also need to
discuss the signs and signi￿cance of the individual coe¢ cients of C21.
Most studies in the literature discuss the e⁄ectiveness/ine⁄ectiveness of aid relative to its
ability to enhance growth de￿ned as GDP or investment growth. Our empirical set-up is
designed to examine the sign and signi￿cance of the estimated long-run impact of aid on these
two variables, but also on private and public consumption. While the interpretation of a
positive/negative e⁄ect on GDP or investment is unambiguous, this is not necessarily the case
with a positive e⁄ect of aid on government consumption which can be both growth enhancing
(if it is associated with expenditure on health and education, say) or growth retarding (if it
is associated with corruption/fungibility). Similarly, a positive e⁄ect on private consumption
can also imply less growth if the increase in consumption is crowding out growth enhancing
investment. To avoid this ambiguity we de￿ne our economic prior in terms of the sign and
signi￿cance of the long-run impact e⁄ect of aid on investment and GDP, and we report the
results that support our prior based on either the ￿rst or second best choice of r:
19As before, we need to address the sensitivity of the results to the choice of rank. If the rank
is too low some of the assumed stochastic trends are stationary rather than non-stationary; if it
is too high some of the deviations from a long-run equilibrium relation are su¢ ciently persistent
to be considered non-stationary rather than stationary. In either case, the magnitude, sign and
signi￿cance of the estimated coe¢ cients of C21 can be in￿ uenced, even considerably so. As the
￿rst or second best choice of rank is often associated with some ambiguity, reporting the results
and conclusions needs to be done cautiously. This problem can be aggravated by the fact that
the preferred choice of rank might to some extent be in￿ uenced by the researcher￿ s economic
prior which may not be openly stated. We address this ambiguity by presenting the results
as openly as possible. To achieve maximum transparency, Table 10 in the Appendix reports
the estimated asymptotic t-ratios for the coe¢ cients in C21 for the ￿rst, second and third best
choice of rank. Based on these, the reader can assess/check our conclusions as well as other
potentially interesting priors/hypotheses.
The results in Section 7.1 are reported from the point of view of a researcher with an
economic prior that foreign aid has been e⁄ective. As this might potentially introduce a ￿ publi-
cation bias￿the results will be complemented with a sensitivity analysis in 7.2, where we ask the
question: ￿ How robust are the results from the point of view of a researcher with an economic
prior that aid is harmful?￿
Finally, we emphasize again that our sample size is very small in statistical terms and
the asymptotic standard errors based on which these t-ratios are calculated may not closely
approximate the correct ones. But even though the t-ratios do not necessarily follow the
Student￿ s t-distribution they are informative of the relative signi￿cance of the estimated long-
run e⁄ects of aid on the macrovariables.
7.1 Assessing the economic prior that aid is e⁄ective
We interpret aid to be potentially e⁄ective if its long-run impact is signi￿cantly positive on
either investment, GDP or both. The reported results is for the ￿rst best choice of rank if it
satis￿es this condition, otherwise we check the second best choice of rank and report the results
if it supports the aid e⁄ectiveness criterion. If neither the ￿rst nor the second best choice of
rank satis￿es the e⁄ectiveness criterion, the one which comes closest to showing a positive e⁄ect
of aid on the macrovariables, for example positive but insigni￿cant e⁄ect, is reported. In this
sense Table 5 reports the results from the point of view of a researcher with an economic prior
that aid has had positive e⁄ects on the macroeconomy.
To improve the readability of Table 5, we have indicated signi￿cance and sign of a coe¢ cient
using the following symbols: + or ￿ implying a t-ratio numerically greater than 2, +0 or ￿0 a
numerical t-ratio between 1.6 and 2; and +00 or ￿00 a numerical t-ratio below 1.6. The results
show that in 27 of our 36 SSA countries aid has had a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on either,
investment, GDP, or both, when choosing between the ￿rst or second best choice of rank. In
seven countries the e⁄ect of aid on GDP or investment is positive but insigni￿cant and in only
two countries, Comoros and Ghana, there is a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect. Thus, according to
20the above criterion there is evidence of aid ine⁄ectiveness only for these two countries. However,
this conclusion may not even be very strong for Ghana where the positive e⁄ect on GDP may
dominate the negative investment e⁄ect.
The results in Table 5 can also be used to check the consistency of the classi￿cation into
Case I, II, III or IV economies in the previous section. We would, for example, expect countries
classi￿ed as Case I and II to have insigni￿cant coe¢ cients in C12 whereas countries classi￿ed
as III and IV to have signi￿cant coe¢ cients. Table 6 provides this information by showing
how the estimated long-run e⁄ects of aid on the four macrovariables are distributed for each
category when distinguishing between signi￿cance and sign.
It appears that aid has had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on investment in 15 out of 20 Case IV
countries and in 6 out of 7 Case III countries, but only in two of nine Case I or II countries.14
In 27 countries the e⁄ect of aid on GDP is similarly positive and statistically signi￿cant in
the majority of cases. The e⁄ect on private and government consumption is positive but with
several insigni￿cant e⁄ects. The last column in the table shows that in three cases aid has had a
signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on private consumption, in two cases on government consumption,
in no case on GDP, and in two cases on investment (Comoros and Ghana).
The results in Table 5 are also consistent with the overall tests of ine⁄ectiveness. For ex-
ample, Burkina Faso, Chad and Swaziland classi￿ed as clear Case II economies show almost
exclusively +00 or ￿00 entries and, according to Table 10, this is relatively robust to the choice
of rank. The fact that there is a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of aid on investment for Tanzania
suggests that this e⁄ect alone was not su¢ ciently strong to show up in the joint tests. Besides,
the Tanzanian results are likely to have been strongly a⁄ected by the period 1992-1995 which
was singled out as particularly in￿ uential for the estimates. This illustrates that a more detailed
investigation is generally needed before one can convincingly argue that aid has had no e⁄ect
in Case I and II countries.
7.2 Is the aid e⁄ectiveness conclusion robust?
The results so far have provided strong support for the aid e⁄ectiveness prior. But this con-
clusion might have been a⁄ected by our ￿ publication bias￿due to the way we have selected the
results. This would indeed be the case if the sign and the signi￿cance of the estimated coe¢ -
cients alternate between the ￿rst and second best choice of rank. Table 7 reports the number
of countries for which either the positive or the negative aid e⁄ectiveness prior is signi￿cantly
supported by the estimated income or investment coe¢ cient. This is done allowing for three
alternative search procedures: (1) only for the preferred rank, (2) between ￿rst or second best
choice of rank and (3) between ￿rst, second, or third best choice of rank.
The entries in the column for ￿ 1st best￿under Economic Prior 1, show that aid has had a
signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on GDP in 12 countries and on investment in 15 when considering
14That aid has a positive e⁄ect on investment in most cases is consistent with the ￿ndings of e.g. Gomanee
et al. (2005). In contrast, Boone (1996) and Dollar and Easterly (1999) generally ￿nd no or little evidence of a
positive investment e⁄ect (see below).
21Table 5: The estimated long-run impact of aid on the macrovariables under the economic prior
of aid e⁄ectiveness
Benin (IV) Botswana (IV) Burkina Faso (II) Burundi (IV)
yt +00 ￿0 +00 +00
invt + + ￿00 +
ct + ￿ +00 +00
gt ￿ +00 +00 +
Cameroon (IV) Ctrl. Afr. Rep. (III) Chad (II) Comoros (I)
yt +00 + ￿00 +0
invt +00 + +00 ￿
ct ￿00 + ￿00 +
gt ￿00 + ￿00 ￿00
Rep. of Congo (II) Djibouti (IV) Ethiopia (IV) Gabon (IV)
yt +00 ￿00 ￿00 +00
invt +0 + + +00
ct ￿00 +00 ￿ +00
gt +00 + + +00
The Gambia (IV) Ghana (IV) Guinea (IV) Kenya (IV)
yt + + +00 +
invt + ￿ + +
ct + ￿00 +00 +
gt + ￿00 + +00
Lesotho (III) Liberia (III) Madagascar (II) Malawi (II)
yt + + + +
invt + + +00 +00
ct + + +00 +
gt + + ￿00 +00
Mali (III) Mauritania (IV) Mauritius (IV) Niger (III)
yt + ￿00 +00 +
invt + + + +
ct ￿ +00 ￿00 +
gt +00 + ￿ +
Nigeria (IV) Rwanda (IV) Senegal (IV) Seychelles (IV)
yt +0 + + ￿00
invt +00 + + +
ct + + + +
gt +00 ￿0 + ￿00
Somalia (II) Sudan (III) Swaziland (II) Tanzania (I)
yt +00 + ￿00 ￿00
invt + + +0 +
ct +00 + ￿00 ￿00
gt ￿00 +00 ￿0 ￿00
Togo (III) Uganda (IV) Zambia (IV) Zimbabwe (IV)
yt + + ￿00 +0
invt +0 + ￿0 +
ct ￿0 + +00 +00
gt + + +0 +
Notes:
1) The entries refer to the sign and signi￿cance of estimated elements of C21:
2) The symbol + or ￿ stands for a t-ratio numerically greater than 2, +0 or ￿0 for a numerical t-ratio
between 1.6 and 2; and +00 or ￿00 for a numerical t-ratio below 1.6.
Source: Authors￿estimations based on Table 10 in Appendix C.
22Table 6: The number of Case I-IV countries according to sign and statistical signi￿cance of the
e⁄ect of aid on the macrovariables
( + ) (+0) (+00) (￿00) (￿0) (￿)
Case I 2 countries
yt - 1 - 1 - -
invt 1 - - - - 1
ct 1 - - 1 - -
gt - - - 2 - -
Case II 7 countries
yt 2 - 3 2 - -
invt 1 2 3 1 - -
ct 1 - 3 3 - -
gt - - 3 3 1 -
Case III 7 countries
yt 7 - - - - -
invt 6 1 - - - -
ct 5 - - - 1 1
gt 5 - 2 - - -
Case VI 20 countries
yt 6 2 6 5 1 -
invt 15 - 3 - 1 1
ct 8 - 6 3 1 2
gt 9 - 5 2 2 2
Source: Table 5.
Table 7: A sensitivity analysis of the e⁄ect of aid on GDP and investment under two di⁄erent
economic priors
Economic Prior 1: Aid is e⁄ective Economic Prior 2: Aid is harmful
Number of countries with signi￿cantly Number of countries with signi￿cantly
positive e⁄ects negative e⁄ects
Choice of rank Choice of rank
1st best 1st or 2nd best 1st, 2nd or 3rd best 1st best 1st or 2nd best 1st, 2nd or 3rd best
GDP 12 17 19 2 6 9
Investment 15 24 25 2 5 7
Source: Authors￿calculations.
23only the preferred rank (r￿) models, whereas only in two countries aid had a signi￿cantly
negative e⁄ect on GDP and investment. The entries in the column ￿ 1st or 2nd best￿are found
under a more ￿ exible search algorithm: if the 1st best rank does not deliver the desired result
but the 2nd best does then we choose the second best. Under the column ￿ 1st, 2nd or 3rd best￿
we extend our search to include also the 3rd best choice of rank.
The results show that if we search for signi￿cantly negative e⁄ects of aid on investment
among the ￿rst or second best calculations we will ￿nd ￿ve such countries, whereas if we search
for signi￿cantly positive e⁄ects we ￿nd 24 cases. For GDP the same ￿gures are six and 17,
respectively. If the search is between the ￿rst, second and third best alternatives, i.e. essentially
all empirically possible values of r; there are signi￿cantly negative aid e⁄ects on GDP and
investment in only 9 respectively 7 countries to be compared with 19 and 25 countries having
signi￿cantly positive aid e⁄ects on GDP and investment. Thus, the search for signi￿cantly
negative investment and GDP e⁄ects in all empirically reasonable speci￿cations only produced
a few countries where this seemed empirically relevant. In contrast, the signi￿cantly positive
e⁄ects received far more support. Altogether we interpret the results of this section as a
strengthening of our previous conclusion that foreign aid has by and large been e⁄ective.
Table 7 focussed exclusively on the long-run impact of aid on GDP and investment. Based
on Table 10 in the Appendix, it is also possible to study other hypotheses from the point of
view of di⁄erent economic priors. For example, suppose we want to ￿nd out whether there
is empirical support for the view that foreign aid has primarily gone to private consumption
without much improvement of investment and/or GDP.15 When we search among ￿rst and
second best speci￿cations in Table 10, we ￿nd evidence supporting such an outcome only for
Benin, Comoros and Mauritania. But if we search among all three speci￿cations, only Comoros
remains and if we only allow for the ￿rst best speci￿cation, Mauritania has a signi￿cantly
positive investment e⁄ect and an insigni￿cant consumption e⁄ect, while Benin has a signi￿cantly
positive investment and private consumption e⁄ect. For the majority of countries positive
consumption e⁄ects of aid are accompanied by positive investment and GDP e⁄ects. If the same
experiment is conducted with government rather than private consumption, the same picture
emerges. In fact, when the choice is between ￿rst and second best speci￿cations, a long-run
positive impact of aid on government consumption is always accompanied by a positive impact
on GDP and/or investment.
We conclude that the aid ine⁄ectiveness view has not received much support in our study
and that the more extreme view suggesting that aid is consumed rather than invested has
essentially received no support.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a broad and statistically well-founded picture of the e⁄ect
of aid on the macroeconomy of 36 SSA countries. Applying our Cointegrated VAR model to
15For investment, such an outcome may result from public investment crowding out private investment fully
or more than that, respectively.
24each of these countries, we found convincing support for the hypothesis that aid has had a
positive long-run impact on investment and GDP in the vast majority of cases, and almost no
support for the hypothesis that aid has had a negative e⁄ect on these variables. In 27 of our 36
SSA countries aid has had a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on either, investment, GDP, or both. In
seven countries the e⁄ect of aid on GDP or investment is positive but insigni￿cant and only in
two countries, Comoros and Ghana, is one of them signi￿cantly negative. Thus, only for these
two countries is there evidence of aid ine⁄ectiveness when one departs from an ￿ aid is e⁄ective￿
economic prior. In addition, (extreme) fungibility meaning that aid increases consumption and
has a negative e⁄ect on investment and/or GDP found no empirical support in our analysis.
When we depart from the ￿ aid is harmful prior￿the di⁄erence in empirical support between
extreme views of aid e⁄ectiveness is striking. In this case, we ￿nd only nine and seven countries,
for which there is a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on GDP and investment, respectively. This is
to be compared with the 19 and 25 cases, respectively, for which there is a signi￿cant positive
e⁄ect when the economic prior ￿ aid is e⁄ective￿is tested. Moreover, we highlight that for
statistically more reliable values of the ￿rst and perhaps second best, this di⁄erence is even more
pronounced. In sum, when searching for signi￿cantly negative investment and GDP e⁄ects for
all empirically reasonable speci￿cations, there is little to point to. Positive signi￿cance receives
far more support. This is noticeable given that the data are still weak.
Our country-based study leads to the following additional more speci￿c conclusions:
￿ The importance of adequately accounting for non-stationarity and cointegration is criti-
cal. Trend-stationarity of aid and the macrovariables was rejected for all SSA countries.
Cointegration is highly signi￿cant, and our sensitivity analyses and robustness checks
demonstrate that the choice of cointegration rank can be qualitatively crucial for the
conclusions reached based on the tests applied to the SSA countries. The use of single
equation modeling, which was particularly common in the early aid-growth literature, is
on this basis very circumscribed. It requires that the cointegration rank must be one
and that aid is exogenous. We found the cointegration rank to be either 2 or 3 (out of
a maximum of 5) in essentially all SSA countries, and aid to be exogenous in only seven
countries. Since exogeneity testing is optimally done within a system of equations, any
continued preference for the more restrictive single equation approach is hard to justify.
￿ The common practice of imposing (untested) parameter restrictions implied by various
data transformations can be problematic. When tested, these restrictions were generally
rejected and they often matter for the conclusions drawn.
￿ It is critical to account for changes in political government, changes in conditionality
conditions imposed by the IMF, major adjustment reforms as well as natural catastrophes,
such as droughts and ￿ oods. Without including these events in the modelling, inference
would have been totally unreliable in many cases. The fact that such extraordinary
events are generally not controlled for in the literature suggest great care is exercised
before policy recommendations are drawn up.
25￿ While the overall qualitative conclusions with respect to aid e⁄ectiveness were rather
similar for the vast majority of countries, SSA countries have been quite heterogeneous
with respect to the transmission of aid on macrovariables. For example, we found that the
exogenous shocks that have pushed the system out of equilibrium and the cointegration
relations that have pulled it back again frequently di⁄ered as to their number and origin
across the countries. Considering that aid is often given for di⁄erent purposes in di⁄erent
countries, this should come as no big surprise. As panel data analyses are implicitly or
explicitly based on an assumption of homogeneous countries across the panel, we reiterate
that panel data studies should not be used as a basis for drawing up relevant policy advice
in individual countries.
Whether aid has worked or not for development has over the years been associated with
many perceived paradoxes and dilemmas. One example is the micro-macro paradox due to
Mosley (see Mosley 1980 and Mosley 1987), which suggests that aid is ine⁄ective at the macro
level. Our study reinforces the emerging professional consensus that there is indeed no paradox
in practice. The economics profession may instead have been excessively preoccupied with
econometric paradoxes due to the fact that data and methodological tools have only been
gradually improving, in parallel with the much greater care that in￿ uential studies should of
course be associated with. Our study in which we started from an explicit stochastic formulation
of all variables without constraining them in pre-speci￿ed directions, stands for example in
marked contrast to Dollar and Easterly (1999). They regressed the investment-to-GDP ratio
on the ODA-to-GDP ratio based on essentially the same kind of data.16 They found as already
alluded to a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect of aid on investment in only eight of 34 cases. This
may be compared with 25 of 36 countries here. We note that the data transformations in
Dollar and Easterly (1999) are based, critically, on an implicit assumption of homogeneity. It
was generally rejected when tested. Their bivariate regression model e⁄ectively assumes just
one relation between the variables (ODA, GDP and investment) and ignores any potential
endogeneity between aid and the macrovariables. Both assumptions were found here to be
inconsistent with the information in the SSA data. Also, inference on their key parameter
is conducted under the assumption that investment-to-GDP and the ODA-to-GDP ratios are
stationary. When tested, stationarity was empirically rejected for most countries. The fact
that Dollar and Easterly (1999) used non-logged data is likely to have increased the non-
stationarity of the ratios. We found that there is substantial support for a log-speci￿cation as
the statistically preferable option.
In sum, the aim of this paper was to learn more about how aid impacts on macroeconomic
variables in SSA. We have found what we see as surprisingly strong evidence in favour of the
thesis that aid works. Nevertheless, we stress in conclusion that the evidence is not perfect.
There are some cases where aid does not seem to have worked given the nature of the evidence
in hand at present. We suggest that they merit careful deeper analysis. Moreover, we were able
to include only four macrovariables to represent the macroeconomy. This means that further
16Their sample, 1965-1995, is however shorter.
26work is needed to capture more convincingly the deeper country context Riddell (2007) refers 
to. In other words, further disaggregation would clearly be desirable to tease out more 
detailed stories as already Papanek (1972) pointed out. 
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Table 8: Countries not included in the study
Country
Miss. aid obs. Reasons for non-inclusion
Angola 2 Data for the macro variable start in 1970 and
aid reaches reasonably high levels only from 1977
Cape Verde 11 Missing aid data
Congo (Dem. Rep. of) 0 Poor data quality for the macrovariables
Cb ote d￿ Ivoire 0 A fundamental structural break around 1980
Equatorial Guinea 13 Missing aid data
Eritrea 33 Missing aid data
Guinea-Bissau 8 Missing aid data
Mayotte 17 Missing aid data
Mozambique 1 The aid data were roughly zero until 1975
Namibia 23 Missing aid data
Sao Tome and Principe 10 Missing aid data
Sierra Leone 0 Negative investment data.
South Africa 33 Missing aid data
31Appendix B: Comparing log versus non-log aid speci￿ca-
tions
Table 9: Comparing residual-based misspeci￿cation tests when using log-aid versus non-log-aid
Auto Corr. Norm. Hetero. R2
Benin log log - -
Botswana log non-log log -
Burkina Faso - - log log
Burundi - - non-log non-log
Cameroon - log log non-log
Ctrl. Afr. Rep. - - - -
Chad - log - -
Comoros - - - -
Rep. of Congo - non-log - -
Djibouti log - - -
Ethiopia log log log -
Gabon Only non-log possible for the full sample
Gambia - - non-log -
Ghana - log log -
Guinea - non-log log -
Kenya - - non-log -
Lesotho - - - -
Liberia - - log log
Madagascar - non-log log -
Malawi - - log -
Mali - log log log
Mauritania - - - -
Mauritius Only non-log possible for the full sample
Niger - - - -
Nigeria - - - -
Rwanda - log non-log non-log
Senegal - - log -
Seychelles - - - -
Somalia log log non-log log
Sudan - log - -
Swaziland log - - -
Tanzania log log - log
Togo - - - -
Uganda - - - -
Zambia - - - -
Zimbabwe - - log non-log
Note: ￿ log￿versus ￿ non-log"indicates which of the aid speci￿cation is preferred,
no entry means equally adequate speci￿cations
Source: Authors￿comparisons.
32Appendix C: The t-ratios of the elements of C21 for dif-
ferent choices of rank
Table 10: The t-ratios of the elements in C21 for the ￿rst best choice of rank with second and
third best choice in brackets
Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi
yt 1.09(-2.40,1.00) -1.76(1.78,-2.52) 0.73(-1.86,-0.56) 0.11(-3.07,2.79)
invt 3.02(-2.40,-8.49) 3.24(0.62,1.88) -0.55(-1.39,0.51) 3.81(3.07,3.98)
ct 3.74(2.40,-0.15) -4.73(1.37,-5.39) 0.92(-1.51,0.45) 0.52(-3.07,0.64)
gt -2.87(-2.40,8.41) 0.87(1.94,-0.81) 0.14(1.00,0.56) 3.74(3.07,6.56)
Cameroon Ctrl. Afr. Rep. Chad Comoros
yt -0.43(-1.80,-2.02) 2.14(2.14,2.06) -0.44(-0.78,-0.44) 1.70(-1.40,6.29)
invt 0.74(0.11,0.48) 2.65(0.57,2.78) 0.54(0.44, 0.44) -3.27(-0.59,-6.29)
ct -0.03(-1.60,-1.85) 2.71(3.15,1.20) -0.74(-0.92,-0.44) 6.60(10.30,6.29)
gt -0.32(-3.93,-3.06) 4.87(7.11,11.37) -0.13(-0.49,-0.44) -0.68(-2.38,6.29)
Rep. of Congo Djibouti Ethiopia Gabon
yt -0.47(0.99,-1.65) 1.45(-1.34,-1.29) -2.11(-0.52,0.52) 0.25(1.02,-1.32)
invt 1.81(1.85,2.24) 1.45(2.14,0.35) 1.42(3.18,0.52) 0.01(1.02,-1.15)
ct -0.56(-0.12,-0.92) 1.45(0.52,0.56) -1.70(-2.21,0.52) -2.78(1.02,-3.08)
gt 0.67(0.90,-2.33) 1.45(2.14,3.50) -3.38(2.38,0.52) 1.22(1.02,-0.64)
The Gambia Ghana Guinea Kenya
yt 4.57(1.89,3.56) 2.71(-0.21,3.35) 1.27(-4.57,-2.75) 3.87(1.58,0.71)
invt 2.91(1.89,0.16) -4.11(-0.21,-3.18) 4.38(4.57,5.01) 3.20(2.93,3.17)
ct 4.21(1.89,3.90) -0.05(-0.21,-0.22) 0.35(-4.57,-1.81) 3.67(2.05,-0.68)
gt 3.49(1.89,2.01) -0.77(-0.21,-2.24) 4.54(4.57,6.05) 0.62(1.07,1.04)
Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi
yt 2.37(2.79,-0.69) -3.38(5.02,-1.49) 2.19(1.59,2.48) 2.82(-4.36,2.35)
invt 2.21(2.65,0.69) -0.48(3.44,-0.56) 0.25(-0.02,1.44) 0.97(1.98,1.49)
ct 3.30(3.39,-0.69) -8.06(3.24,-1.49) 1.50(0.45,-0.77) 2.59(-1.93,2.30)
gt 2.27(1.60,-0.69) -1.67(6.52,-0.24) -0.67(-1.23,-2.05) 0.62(1.13,1.33)
Mali Mauritania Mauritius Niger
yt 3.03(0.21,-0.96) -0.96(0.63,2.42) 0.04(0.71,0.61) 0.94(2.57,1.31)
invt 6.54(7.09,6.44) 3.17(-2.90,2.42) 3.92(4.08,2.12) 1.06(5.12,1.31)
ct -4.95(-5.38,0.13) 0.66( 4.22,2.42) -1.39(-0.75,-1.32) -0.98(3.65,-1.31)
gt 1.17(0.83,3.84) 2.93(1.34,2.42) -4.34(-1.35,-1.94) 1.40(2.83,1.31)
Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Seychelles
yt 1.95(3.82,0.00) 0.98(3.38,6.24) 2.02(4.04,1.60) -1.06(-0.08,-0.99)
invt 1.45(-1.60,-0.00) 2.16(3.38,3.28) 0.42(2.63,-1.60) 0.71(3.71,0.87)
ct 2.11(1.47,0.00) 3.27(3.38,1.01) 2.07(2.25,1.60) 6.10(2.06,0.83)
gt 1.51(-6.06,0.00) -1.81(-3.38,4.72) 2.20(3.90,1.60) 0.18(-0.79,0.92)
Somalia Sudan Swaziland Tanzania
yt 0.58(-0.22,1.32) 2.62(1.98,2.56) -0.09(0.84,0.35) -1.17(-1.43,-1.30)
invt 2.23(0.06,-5.51) 3.59(2.69,2.56) 1.60(-2.44,-0.35) 0.36(3.25,-1.42)
ct 0.99(0.07,4.31) 4.07(1.64,2.56) -0.36(-2.27,0.35) -0.03(-1.28,-1.17)
gt -0.90(-1.21,2.28) 1.48(0.96,-2.56) -1.67(-1.24,0.35) -0.87(-0.10,0.33)
Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
yt 3.69(2.03,0.43) 1.21(2.71,-2.58) -0.13(-0.14,0.23) 0.17(1.90,2.23)
invt -0.95(1.81,-6.51) 1.23(2.71,1.51) -1.70(-1.96,0.23) -1.71(2.33,2.23)
ct 4.95(-1.63,0.39) 0.44(2.71,-3.63) 1.41(1.01,0.23) 0.98(1.31,2.23)
gt 2.19(3.76,1.87) 1.48(2.71,-0.91) 1.61(0.55,0.23) 1.83(2.32,2.23)
Note: In almost all cases the third best choice of r is within the range r￿ ￿ 1:
Source: Authors￿calculations. 33